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Effects of the Presence of Democracy in Hegemons on Hegemonic Intervention in a 
Unipolar System 
 
Michael Sheflin ‘08 
 
 
This paper outlines major theoretical elements of the effects of democracy and hegemony 
on intervention and peace.  In particular, it examines the effect of the presence of 
democracy in hegemonic military and coercive intervention, and non-intervention.  The 
presence of democracy in an intervening hegemon can have a significant and pronounced 
effect on policy-choices and success in advancing peaceful-resolution mechanisms and 
norms for dispute-resolution. 
 
 
Over the past decade and a half, there 
has been significant progress toward 
consensus on hypotheses, and production 
of research and data relating to ‘The 
Democratic Peace.’  The initial simplistic 
and untrue contention that democracies 
do not go to war led to the rejection of 
such a Monadic Hypothesis, and its 
subsequent reformation and acceptance 
in the form of the Dyadic Hypothesis.  
Consensus regarding the Dyadic 
Hypothesis,1 that the presence of 
democracy in two states will reduce the 
likelihood of conflict, has led to new 
research on previously tangential issues of 
research and meta-theory.  Some issues 
are still contested and controversial 
whereas others may be straightforward 
and marginal, but significant hypotheses 
have resulted from what initially started 
as merely an endorsement of Democratic 
Pacifism.  The end of the Cold War has 
produced a shift from systemic bipolarity 
to hegemony.  This massive shift 
occurred on a systemic level, but states 
have also sought hegemony regionally.  
The growing importance of the 
                                                
1 The likelihood of two democratic states going to 
war is inversely proportional to the level of 
democracy in each member of a dyad. 
phenomena of hegemonic bids, and our 
increasing wealth of information about 
cases and states leads to the inevitable 
questions of how democracy may affect 
hegemony.  Because humanitarian 
interventions are becoming more 
numerous and expansive, multilaterally 
and unilaterally, the effect of democracy 
on hegemonic action is acutely important 
as manifested in terms of its effect on 
hegemonic intervention.  What have 
been the effects of the level of democracy 
present in a hegemon on hegemonic 
intervention: how does democracy affect 
intervention, effectiveness (en bello), and 
peace resolution? 
 
I.  Democracy, Hegemony, and 
Intervention 
In the post-Cold War period, the United 
Nations has been able to take an 
unprecedented role in mandating or not 
mandating peacekeeping.  A major source 
of optimism for American UN analysts 
and observers was that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union would reverse the USSR-
USA deadlock over the Security Council 
veto capability.  Hegemonic aspirations 
on the regional level have created a state 
interest in using military intervention as a 
1
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springboard for broader leadership bids, 
and also to demonstrate hegemonic 
capacity.  Hegemonic intervention 
involves hegemonic bids for leadership 
(Adebajo 64) and not merely 
participation.  Therefore, the hegemon 
in a given situation is the state who 
spearheads a bid, rather than that with 
the greatest capacity and capacity to 
project.  It is very unlikely that a situation 
will arise in which multiple hegemons 
spearhead missions, as any other aspiring 
hegemon would generally be a supporting 
player.2  However, as it may affect the 
outcome of peace, it is important to note 
whether there is confluence between the 
US and other hegemons.  
 
Democratic Peace is concerned with the 
effects of democracy on international 
relations.  As mentioned briefly, many 
studies have dealt with the effects of 
democracy on dyadic conflict.  These 
hypotheses will be integrated within the 
following analysis.  However, Democratic 
Peace research to date has ignored the 
effect of the level of democracy in a 
hegemon on peace.  Analysis of the 
limited number of cases of hegemonic 
interventions in disputes since the Cold 
War yields insight into this matter, but 
more research – data sets and focus on 
                                                
2 The multilateral framework necessary for a truly 
joint bid, especially for as sensitive a subject as 
intervention, has not existed and is unlikely to 
manifest itself in the near future.  This may 
become increasingly problematic moving into 
multilateral intervention or regional blocs such as 
AU, UN, and EU intervention.  One answer is 
that such multilateral interventions are not 
hegemonic, but this is not sufficient to deal with 
hegemonic participation within a multilateral 
framework.  Such a theoretical problem mandates 
greater enquiry, especially since states which 
accept democratic norms are more likely to 
participate in such a framework. 
democracy’s effect on hegemony and 
intervention – is required for a better 
understanding of what may become the 
most common democratic form of 
militarized conflict. 
 
Because the timing of intervention can 
alter the effectiveness of intervention, it is 
important to establish several things.  
Preceding intervention, is there an 
identifiable conflict between groups?  
Such a conflict need not be military, but 
rather a distinct and identifiable dispute 
between discernible actors.  There has 
been a growing propensity to include 
intra-state conflict as a potential threat to 
international peace, and thus domestic 
strife and humanitarianism have led to 
interventions.  The other important 
component is the end of conflict.  The 
way this paper will measure peace is 
relatively simplistic but goes beyond 
traditional notions of state-centered peace 
resolution.  A conflict is resolved if all 
relevant parties have dropped the 
relevant disputed claims and have 
explicit ly  recognized the s tatus  quo as  
tenable .  In some sense this is a tough 
standard, but can include a variety of 
configurations and scenarios for peace 
settlement.  Additionally, this definition 
takes into account the fact that 
traditional inter-state peace resolution 
may not actually contribute to peace.  
The inclusion of non-state actors’ 
interests and disputes is integral and 
highly relevant.  Though states have 
generally dominated “organized 
violence,” there is a growing recognition 
that “non-state actors, whether domestic 
or transnational, have important, even 
decisive, effects on the frequency and/or 
manner in which states engage in 
organized violence” (Wendt 9). 
2
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However, judging conflict’s end in this 
manner also means that evolving interests 
or dispute-claims complicate the 
situation.  Greater consensus in 
standards will be required because of the 
difficulty in achieving or even creating a 
universal standard spanning a variety of 
disparate units and actors.  Thus the 
identification of the core of the dispute is 
utmost because rhetoric and policies 
often change (especially in democracies) 
over time.  Additionally, non-state actors 
are subject to different constraints than 
states, so it is necessary to justify their 
inclusion within this model.   
 
II.  Methodological and Epistemological 
Issues: 
Non-state actors complicate recognition 
of the status quo because of their 
exclusion, generally, from direct 
sovereignty, and often (as with Hizballah) 
because their creation stems from 
unpopular state policies and gaps in 
sovereignty.  They, therefore may not be 
prone to recognize the status quo, and 
are not constrained by the same norms as 
state actors in a state-oriented 
international system.  This may illustrate 
that a systemic effect of democracy is the 
inability of states in general to impose 
unfavorable and unpopular status-quos 
indiscriminate of powerful domestic 
lobbies.  In addition to realists, Liberals 
and neo-conservatives also recognize the 
immense importance of dealing with 
non-state actors that pose threats to peace 
either implicitly or sometimes through 
militarily confrontation.  In the post-
Cold War period, interventions have 
increasingly been directed at the 
alleviation of humanitarian conditions, 
which does not always necessitate the use 
of military force. 
 
Traditional Democratic Peace literature 
has tended to deal with states largely 
because most studies examine the effect 
of democracy on states.3  System-level 
effects have mostly dealt with norms, 
often through benchmarks like state 
norm-compliance.  Therefore, that the 
literature does not deal expressly with 
non-state actors is neither surprising nor 
particularly problematic to methodology.  
It does, however, warrant significant 
renewed research efforts and new 
directions more generally.  The argument 
here is not to test the amount of 
democracy present in disputants 
quantitatively per se.  There are very few 
cases of democratic non-state actors in 
interventions.  The present system of 
states leaves few opportunities for grand 
gaps in power or sovereignty that could 
allow for a viable hegemonic non-state 
actor.4  We will have accurate measures 
of the democracy and autocracy levels of 
any hegemonic actors and must therefore 
only justify that disputant non-state 
actors can be treated in a theoretically 
similar manner to disputant state actors.  
The roots of this argument are implicit in 
a good deal of prominent theory and 
policy-making.  Just as Kegley and 
Hermann recognize a spectrum of 
political configurations across 
democracies and autocracies (Kegley and 
                                                
3 Those that look beyond state aggregation look 
often at the effect on leaders (like Kegley and 
Herman) – but thus those leaders’ subsequent 
effects on state policy. 
4 Hamas and the former Union of Islamic Courts 
in Somalia may be counted as non-state actors 
that upon achieving degrees of sovereignty were 
unable to incorporate into the international 
status quo. 
3
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Hermann 520), so such spectra may 
occur in non-state actors (and 
organizations).  These organizations have 
their own leaders, beliefs, interests, 
platforms, and in some cases degrees of 
de facto sovereignty. 
 
Another methodological stumbling block 
is how to deal with the systemic hegemon 
– the United States – versus regional 
hegemons.  Confluence between the two 
levels of hegemony is not hugely difficult 
to deal with, but what effect does 
democracy have on this confluence?  This 
creates two distinct problems.  The first is 
how to deal with regional-systemic 
discord regarding intervention, and how 
potential confluence/conflict affects 
peace.  The second is whether the 
presence of democracy in the hegemon 
has an effect on such confluence.  
Because the systemic hegemon is 
democratic as a constant, there is reason 
to believe that the level of democracy at 
the regional level of hegemony is not as 
important as other factors.  In part this 
reflects the normative argument that 
systemic hegemony helps create and 
promote norms other states are more 
willing to follow. XXX Also the problem 
of what the state system structure is and 
whether there is hegemony.  Issue of 
Pfaff’s criticism. 
 
The level of economic development 
present in disputants may also make a 
significant difference in peace, especially 
post-conflict.  In general, as economic 
development increases, post-conflict 
settlement and rebuilding will also be 
smoother.  This may additionally mean 
that intervention in well-developed 
economies may tend to produce a more 
pacific outcome than intervention in less-
developed economies over the long-term.  
Economic development may also temper 
aggression within dyads, as domestic 
interests become more entrenched and 
complex (Dixon and Senese 565). 
 
As with the definition of wars in the 
Democratic Peace Research Project, there 
is some question about what is meant by 
“intervention” rather than more 
normalized “involvement.”  This paper 
adopts the view that there are two forms 
of intervention, in addition to non-
intervention.  The first form – military 
intervention – involves a third-party 
directing military force against one or 
more parties in a pre-existing dispute.  
The second form – coercive intervention 
– involves soft-power means such as 
sanctions, inspections, and third-party 
peace negotiations, but not the 
deployment of military force.  Finally, as 
the presence of democracy in disputant 
states tends to abate violence, the dyadic 
presence of democracy must also be taken 
into account, and has been dealt with 
sufficiently in traditional Democratic 
Peace literature. 
 
III.  Core Hypotheses and Theoretical 
Claims: 
Before corroborating theory with cases, it 
is necessary to outline some underlying 
theoretical elements integral to the 
analysis of democratic hegemony.1 
                                                
1 Democratic hegemony refers to a hegemonic 
state in whose governance there are extant 
elements of democracy – i.e. hegemons that are 
democratic. 
4
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Hegemony: 
The effects of hegemony themselves may 
have an effect on peace, so cases will 
examine both democratic and non-
democratic hegemons to isolate the 
effects of democracy in particular.  This 
issue is complicated by the fact that in the 
period being study hegemony has 
continually existed on the systemic level, 
even in the absence of regional 
hegemonic arrangements.  There may be 
legitimacy to the argument that the level 
on which hegemony exists affects the 
outcome.  Just as geographical proximity 
plays a role in defining capacity and 
capabilities for intervention-decisions, the 
outcome may also be affected by the level 
and particular factors of a hegemonic 
arrangement. 
 
Hegemony may also strongly encourage 
certain norms, especially during 
intervention.  Similarly, the interests of 
members of a dyad may be subverted in 
favor of those of the hegemon.  This can 
lead to ignoring problems or destroying 
the capability of the dyadic state, 
breeding dependency on the hegemon 
(Morales 6).  This can affect the outcome 
by, in the case of the former, producing 
incomplete settlements and lengthening 
conflict.  Large-scale destruction of 
capabilities can also increase the duration 
of conflict and intervention, often also 
encouraging nationalism and violent 
resistance, imminently apparent from the 
Iraq and Lebanon invasions. 
 
Democratic Hegemony 
The effects of hegemony, normatively 
and systemically, are not the effects of 
democracy on hegemony specifically.  
Democratic hegemony ideally reinforces 
dispute-resolution mechanisms and 
encourages the “democratic norm of 
bounded competition” (Dixon and Senese 
548).  The encouragement of democratic 
norms even on one side of the dyad can 
alter the conditions of conflict on state 
and individual levels.  Much of this relies 
on policy and not merely rhetoric, and 
since the Iraq War global perception may 
have shifted away from close-cooperation 
with the United States.  Ironically, 
because neo-conservatives generally 
believe dictators do not negotiate in good 
faith, they have created a situation in 
which the US is forced to subvert or de-
prioritize its own stated international 
norms and agreements.  Normatively and 
materially there are limits to 
unilateralism,2 and autocratic states may 
therefore be more likely to cite double 
standards and not conform to norms 
when confronted with heavy-handed 
unilateral hegemony.  The differing 
accounts of the US 2003 invasion of Iraq 
provide a very good example of this.  
Whereas, US leaders and citizens were 
generally believed Iraqis would welcome 
freedom and renounce what they saw as 
tyranny.  Conversely, the attempt to 
impose a foreign political system has 
become increasingly unpopular in Iraq.  
Undoubtedly, the perception of political 
imposition has aided anti-American 
sentiment.  The initially limited 
Ethiopian invasion has followed a similar 
course.  Although its original intent was 
to bolster the Somali Provisional 
Government, intervention is now largely 
perceived as a crusade; with religious 
imperialism an increasingly powerful 
view.  The insurrections and lengthening 
interventions in both cases have helped 
                                                
2 Unilateralism may be seen to breach various 
norms and therefore weaken their ability to 
influence. 
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challenge the infinite nature of 
hegemonic power. 
 
Parity in power does not take into 
account the importance of ideas and 
nationalism particularly.  Citizens of the 
hegemonic nation have access to similar 
or greater information in the present 
system and are not immune to such 
argumentation.  Because of the structure 
of most of the spectrum of democratic 
governments, it is more difficult for 
democratic hegemons to sustain 
interventions.  Peace-settlements may also 
be more prone to sub-state hegemonic 
interests, which tend to be disparate and 
divergent as a result of economic 
liberalism, the presence of civil society, 
and democracy’s effects on societies. 
 
States that accept hegemonic leadership 
bids must also perceive it as broadly or 
narrowly in their interest to do so.  
Alternatively, leaders of those states 
accepting hegemonic bids must broadly 
perceive it in their interests of survival or 
political or material gain – if it is not 
perceived to be in the state’s interest.  
Systemically it has been argued that as the 
number of democracies increases, non-
democratic states are more willing to 
accept democratic norms of conflict 
resolution (Mitchell 755).  Publics and 
leaders are more likely to see similar 
governmental configurations as a “like 
unit” (Kegley and Hermann 518).  Much 
like ethnocentricity in psychology, leaders 
are more likely to see greater similarity 
between their own state and a state with a 
purportedly similar political 
configuration.  It follows, therefore, that 
non-democratic states are more likely to 
accept hegemonic authority if they are 
likely to accept democratic norms.3  
Without implying causation, states that 
are likely to accept democratic hegemonic 
leadership are likely to accept democratic 
norms.  This provides an opportunity for 
the expansion of bounded competition, 
assisting speedier and more 
comprehensive resolution of disputes.  
However, the acceptance of democratic 
hegemony does not mean that hegemonic 
interests become democratic.  Conflicts 
may be ignored or prolonged, and 
intervention producing a settlement may 
not always tend toward the democratic 
norms in question.  Additionally, the 
War on Terror provides an acute example 
of state conformity to non-democratic 
norms.  The US has been increasingly 
willing to overlook foreign military 
deployment, in situations that would 
normally mandate internal policing, to 
counter terrorism.  This distracts from 
those states’ non-compliance with 
democratic norms in favor of the broader 
hegemonic agenda prioritized at that 
time.  The following case studies serve to 
elucidate the confluence of the 
theoretical effect of democracy on 
hegemony in the harsh realities facing 
bids and prosecution of hegemonic 
leadership and hegemonic intervention. 
 
IV.  Case Analyses: 
This argument requires an inclusive look 
at the spectrum of policy options 
available to hegemonic actors, to gauge 
the effect of the presence of democracy in 
hegemons on peace.  They are laid out as 
follows: military intervention, non-
military intervention, and non-
                                                
3 Or are more likely to accept democratic norms 
in hegemony/Especially likely to accept 
hegemonic norms if they accept hegemonic 
leadership. 
6
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intervention.  Although their centrality is 
not as great, the effects of democracy on 
non-intervention yield important insight. 
 
Military Intervention: 
Military intervention refers specifically to 
the deployment of military force; so it 
does not necessarily include the same 
benchmarks theoretically attributed to 
“war.”  Some democratic military 
interventions, as in Somalia and Iraq, 
provide evidence of prolonged conflict 
due to unclear or expanding goals.  Issues 
with efficiency are more likely to affect 
policy and thus outcomes in governments 
with democratic participation.  That is, 
poor military execution is likely to end or 
delay the careers of various politicians 
involved in the war, making democracies 
more likely to terminate or alter 
interventions.  Even if key leaders do 
retain their job, alteration of policies is a 
necessary determinant of their political 
survival.  This may occur regardless of the 
progress of the intervention, and can 
alter or disrupt the goals or execution, 
and will be examined in greater depth 
when looking at psychology. 
 
The normative argument would suggest a 
greater propensity for democratic norms 
of jus ad bellum and jus en bello by 
democracies than in non-democracies.  
The argument follows that democracies, 
more likely to promote human rights and 
justice in and for war domestically, are 
more likely to include those norms in 
foreign policies (Dixon and Senese 549; 
and Kegley and Herman 512).  At times, 
therefore, such policies are more likely to 
support status quo norms and moderate 
aggressive policy.  At other times, it may 
make democratic leaders less attentive to 
international norms that conflict with the 
human rights based view of international 
politics.  The alternative explanation is 
that democratic leaders are constrained 
by domestic institutions (Kegley and 
Hermann 514).  Sovereignty norms and 
capability restrictions tend to constrain 
the universal application of such policies 
– but only if those norms and restrictions 
are perceived to be binding.  Democracies 
that have binding institutions and norms 
domestically are more likely to replicate 
those perceptions and the resulting 
behavior in international policy. 
 
Traditionally, one of societies’ key goals 
has been to reproduce the norms and 
categorizations essential to the 
functioning of those societies, or such 
societies would fail or die.  Just as 
domestic models try to reproduce key 
norms, so the international system – even 
in anarchy – sometimes demands 
conformity to such norms.  The norm of 
sovereignty, increasingly challenged by 
non-state actors, has also been challenged 
by some American policymakers.  They 
may see American interests as relatively 
unaffected by norms.  Even should such 
policymakers believe that they prioritize 
national interests above constraining 
norms and institutions, to a certain 
extent their perceptions and motivations 
are based on those norms or institutions, 
if only that the perceived interests are a 
reaction.  Either way, the greater 
penchant for American leaders, in both 
Bush Jr. Administrations, to sideline 
traditional international norms that were 
seen as confluent with “American 
interests” means by some accounts that 
“the United States is not a status quo 
power” (Jervis 383).  As the proportion of 
democracies in the system increases, non-
democratic states are therefore more 
7
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likely to be receptive to democratic norms 
(Mitchell 755).  Hegemony may strongly 
influence both levels of norm creation 
identified by Sara McLaughlin Mitchell: 
Norm Emergence and Norm Acceptance 
(Mitchell 751-753).  Hegemons can help 
define the agenda of norms, and can thus 
do so with regard to its own interests.  
Additionally, they may grant perception 
of the international community’s 
acceptance, thus promoting international 
acceptance in actuality.  As with the War 
on Terror, the US has helped push a 
particular issue into international 
prominence. 
 
Once norms become more universal 
states that do not accept the international 
order, and especially the norm of 
sovereignty, are more likely to be labeled 
“rogue states” (Wendt 286).  This rule 
cannot be universalized, because it is very 
difficult, in some cases, to predict how 
similarly leaders will perceive other states 
to that over which they preside.  In 
reality, governments with similar political 
configurations may harbor a great deal of 
enmity and perceive vast dissimilarities.  
Democracies have tended to perceive 
each other in this way and therefore 
exhibit, at least in theory, a greater degree 
of understanding and amity.  No doubt, a 
complete disregard for norms is likely to 
upset the perception of “like units” 
between states.  Non-state actors have an 
even more “tenuous standing” (Wendt 
353).  Since the “Axis of Evil” speech, 
there has been implicit US recognition of 
a greater polarization between rogue and 
status quo states.  There are cases, as with 
the US in Iraq and the War on Terror, in 
which democratic norms are ignored by 
democratic states, in particular 
democracies whose populations feel 
threatened or are in conflict, in which 
leaders and not democratic publics are 
granted greater leadership (Kegley and 
Hermann 516).  With most cases, 
however, potential “rogues” of 
international norms are autocratic states 
or organizations, normatively 
encouraging perceptions of “the other.”  
In any case, the reduction of democratic 
norms compliance has a negative effect 
on prospects for peaceful settlement and 
peace more generally.  Given this 
argument, actual compliance to 
democratic norms may not be as 
important as perception of compliance to 
democratic norms.  Thus countries may 
call themselves democratic, or align with 
certain key international priorities, 
without an actual exhibition of 
democratic norms on the ground.  Thus, 
Pakistan can call itself democratic and 
have elections, but can also allow 
extensive government and military 
meddling under the guise of the 
hegemonically-driven War on Terror. 
 
The final corollary is the argument that 
the perception of hegemonic decline, and 
in particular cuts in defense spending, 
can lead to the reinterpretation of 
interests and the invention of crises and 
conflicts (Morales 14).  Democracies are 
not necessarily more immune to media 
sensationalism, and some sociologists 
have sought to explain Israeli policy 
primarily as fear-based-responses (Impact 
of The Lebanon War on Hamas and 
Kadima).  This may be true of the case of 
Iraq prior to invasion, in which the War 
was in part a result of the perception of 
the US’s decline and the need to reassert 
military power, which may be a common 
result of hegemonic decline (Morales 14).  
Unable to assert the perception of safety 
8
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from terrorism, in light of economic 
recession, the US invented a crisis.  This 
makes more sense with regard to the 
situation in border settlements and 
Kibbutzim in Israel prior to the Lebanon 
War in 2006.  Very few people have been 
injured by rocket attacks, especially in 
comparison to the Israeli reprisal.  
However, the very presence of those 
rockets injures the general sense of 
security, despite the actual threat to 
safety, and contributes to the need for a 
grand positive action.  As the conflict 
soured, continued efforts at military 
victory are framed as central to US 
interests as a result of hegemonic decline 
because of the initial Iraq conflict.  
Conceivably then, conflict resulting from 
a crisis of decline could reinforce 
perception of decline and reinforce crises.  
Conflict and crisis also tend to spur 
reallocations of power to leaders and 
away from the public, in democratic 
states, thus reducing the degree of 
democratic policymaking (Kegley and 
Hermann 516). 
 
Democratic Military Intervention: 
There has been a longstanding conflict 
over territorial and political sovereignty 
between Hizballah and Lebanon, in 
which Israel intervened in 2006 as a 
democratic regional hegemon with US 
support.  Nigerian intervention in 
Liberia, represented a policy of aspiring 
(autocratic) regional hegemony assisted 
and legitimized by the United States. 
 
In 1975, Israel began incursions into 
Lebanon to dislodge the PLO, ultimately 
leading to an occupation of Southern 
Lebanon between 1982 and 2000.  The 
gap in Lebanese territorial control helped 
create Hizballah, which has evolved 
beyond merely an armed resistance group 
into a Lebanese political and military 
player.  Hizballah has periodically 
engaged in low-intensity conflict with 
Israel, and Israel has also periodically 
bombed Hizballah locations within 
Lebanon.  This no doubt bred serious 
distrust between the Lebanese and Israeli 
publics and politicians, and contributed 
to Hizballah’s popularity and growing 
domestic power in Lebanon.  The present 
conflict began in July 2006, when 
Hizballah attacked a border post and 
captured Israeli soldiers.  Israel retaliated 
not just against Hizballah but also against 
Lebanese targets such as the airport and 
major population centers. 
 
The outcome has been inconclusive.  
Lebanon’s government has deployed 
forces in territory bordering Israel that 
was almost exclusively controlled by 
Hizballah.  However, Hizballah maintains 
a powerful military and political element 
in Lebanon, and Israel has at best 
managed to reinforce a poorly defined 
status quo or to legitimize the group they 
sought to destroy.  Largely, this can be 
attributed to the unilateral nature of 
Israel’s invasion and the unprecedented 
amount of support granted by the US to 
Israel.  The US appeared to have 
complicit interests in destroying 
Hizballah as a terrorist group. 
 
Conclusions for Democratic Military 
Intervention: 
The unilateral nature of Israel’s invasion 
meant that the interests of Israeli elites 
and policy makers are most relevant in 
explaining the intervention.  Hizballah 
had launched missiles and infrequent 
attacks that created an environment of 
insecurity in Israel, weakening democratic 
norms in leaders and the population.  
Additionally, leaders needed to take 
9
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action in order to not alienate themselves 
from an increasingly frustrated public.  
Clearly sanctions in response to violent 
attacks would not do enough to salvage 
the political survival of Kadima and Ehud 
Olmert.  The de-legitimization of Israeli 
norms for peaceful resolution have 
occurred over the course of a half-
century, with a nation consistently under 
threat since its independence.  Wars with 
Arab states and Palestinian groups have 
created a (hopefully declining) perception 
of “us versus them,” in which them was 
everybody but Israel and international 
Jewry.  Additionally, Israeli and American 
policy makers were far more empathetic 
to Lebanon than Hizballah, as a terrorist 
non-state actor, and expressed a desire to 
unburden Lebanon of Hizballah. 
 
The method of the intervention was not 
commensurate with this approach.  Israel 
bombed major population centers, 
blockaded Lebanon, and destroyed a 
significant proportion of the country’s 
infrastructure.  Raids of hospitals clearly 
served no purpose in deterring or 
destroying Hizballah’s capability to 
attack.  Rather in a partial democracy 
with a very low level of democracy and 
democratic persistence, many people have 
increasingly opted to support Hizballah 
rather than the government.  The 
Lebanese government also has a long 
legacy of the perception of democracy, 
and so its inaction in response to Israeli 
attacks may have been aided by a view of 
Israel as a like-state.  This may also have 
created much of the confusion and shock 
over Israel’s destruction of Lebanese 
targets.  The historical animosity between 
the two states especially since 1982 has 
also hurt the perception by both states of 
like units. 
 
Partly, there has been an unprecedented 
confluence of interests between the 
Israeli and American leadership since the 
election of Bush in 2000 and Sharon in 
2001 (Rynhold, Steinberg 2004).  Unlike 
his father, Bush has allowed Israel 
unprecedented latitude in terms of 
granting loans and not applying pressure 
in response to Israeli contravention of 
democratic norms and international law.  
This may be aided by the perception, 
especially after 911, that the Israeli state 
is bounded by terrorist states and 
organizations.  The US actually resisted 
pressure to assist in any cease-fire efforts 
until August, and afterwards renewed 
Israeli military aid.  The confluence of 
US hegemony was not enough to secure 
complete Israeli regional hegemony, 
however, because it employed unilateral 
action.  This meant that the military 
failure weakened Israel’s long-term policy 
of perceived military dominance and 
unquestioned hegemony.  The failure of 
military victory resulting from the war, 
allowed a greater capacity for other states 
to attempt to assert influence (Bahgat).  
Influence was not asserted hegemonically 
or domineeringly (as a hegemonic bid) 
largely because of the almost universal 
recognition after Iraq (2003) and 
Lebanon (2006) that unilateral military 
action is unlikely to produce peace. 
 
Detraction from US hegemonic support 
for Israel may not have a purely negative 
effect.  Since the war, there has been 
significantly greater velocity for the Saudi 
Peace Plan, and Saudi Arabia has also 
had a greater role to play in the related 
Palestinian conflict.  This may potentially 
benefit Israel, but Lebanon’s political 
situation has deteriorated further lacking 
10
Colgate Academic Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol3/iss1/3
 13 
consensus on the presidency.  Hizballah 
has also become more recalcitrant in its 
rhetoric, seeing the capacity and the 
legitimacy of the Lebanese government in 
question.  It has little to lose 
internationally, from an international 
community that considers it a terrorist 
organization.  Domestically and 
regionally its hard-line has earned it 
increasing support as a viable Lebanese 
challenger to Israel. 
 
Some spectators were encouraged by the 
deployment of Lebanese troops in the 
south after more than 20 years.  
Lebanon’s political deadlock was no 
doubt created as a result of the war.  In 
Israel, which is more democratic, 
however, the misconduct during the war, 
and its failure to achieve its goals, have 
put the viability of Kadima in question.  
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has come 
under increasing domestic pressure as 
several reports and investigations have 
been launched regarding the conduct and 
prosecution of the War.  Clearly 
hegemonic unilateralism, especially in 
military intervention, is a risky endeavor.  
Leaders may end their careers if 
intervention fails, and thus in 
democracies are often inclined to attempt 
other policy options first.  Israel is an odd 
case because its society and politics have 
suffered from years of crisis, which 
weaken domestic perception of the 
binding nature of democratic norms, as 
expected. 
 
Autocratic Military Intervention: ECOMOG in 
Liberia 
The case of Nigerian intervention in 
Liberia in particular helps further 
illuminate drawbacks of democratic 
hegemonic intervention, and the limits of 
broad labels for regime type not reflective 
of the potential diversity of actual regime 
configurations. 
 
In In Search of Warlords, Akeye Adebajo 
outlines the various domestic and 
international problems facing hegemonic 
interventions as they affect the Nigerian 
intervention in Liberia.  Nigeria began 
sending peacekeeping troops under the 
umbrella of ECOMOG, a military 
adjunct of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), in 
1990.  Though Nigeria was still a 
relatively poor country it had a 
historically continuous policy and 
rhetoric supporting the idea of Nigerian 
hegemony or even possibly empire (64).  
Warlords, most notably Charles Taylor, 
began leading reprisal attacks on 
peacekeepers in an attempt to end the 
mission (63).  This subsequently led to 
increasing search and capture missions 
for the warlords or guerilla commanders 
that “compromised the neutrality of the 
missions and led to civilian deaths” ( 63).  
Therefore, mandates must be broad 
enough that intervening troops can 
contribute to actual peace keeping 
operations, but not too broad that they 
would be subject to accusations of 
misconduct. 
 
‘Pax Nigeriana,’ expressed by a former 
Nigerian ambassador as “a Monroe 
Doctrine of sorts” (Adebajo 66) colluded 
with US interests4 resulting in strategic 
                                                
4 The intervention actually involved US troops, 
although the intervention was largely spearheaded 
and commanded by Nigeria.  The intervention is 
not considered an example of US hegemonic 
intervention but rather of US multilateral 
cooperation in league with Nigerian regional 
hegemony.  Systemic effects of US hegemony and 
democracy may be examined, but without the 
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and tactical collusion especially regarding 
troop deployments ( 68).  African states 
accepted Nigerian hegemony for two 
main reasons.  Guinnea and Sierra Leone 
had received hundreds of thousands of 
refugees whereas Ghana and Gambia 
feared domestic citizens’ cooperation 
with rebel groups ( 69).  Adebajo also says 
France wanted to prevent American 
predominance in its former sphere of 
influence whereas Germany wished to set 
a precedent for peacekeeping ( 69).  
Democracy appears not to have had a 
significant effect on acceptance of the 
hegemonic leadership bid, but aside from 
European states and the US, these states 
are not democratic. 
 
It is important to note that whereas the 
deployment of troops may have been a 
very efficient multilateral arrangement, 
the problem was not recognized as trans-
national exactly.  Rather, Adebajo implies 
that the individual nature of states’ 
interests in providing support and a 
particular layout for the intervention also 
contributed to disunity (Adebajo 69).  
Soon after the deployments began, the 
warlords began their reprisal campaigns 
to end intervention also exacerbating 
tensions between the peacekeeping 
donors.  The Nigerian response was hard-
line, and began a series of “obsessive” 
campaigns to kill Taylor ( 71).  The 
objective became Taylor, and Nigeria was 
accused of indiscriminate heavy-
handedness and even theft and 
smuggling (Adebajo 73).5  The 
governmental stance was a refusal to be 
intimidated or withdraw, but the 
                                                                 
expectation that the US was intervening as a 
hegemon. 
5 Not dissimilar to accusations against the United 
States and to a certain extent Israel. 
objective became Taylor ( 71).  Such a 
hard-line was difficult to maintain and 
partly in response to Ghanaian pressure, 
tactics eventually moved away from 
military confrontation in favor of 
cooperation or bargaining ().  The 
prolonged nature and unclear goals of 
the campaign led to public hostility, but 
there was no domestic option available 
for public recourse (Adebajo 72).  This is 
corroborated by Nigeria’s Polity IV 
democracy and autocracy rankings (See: 
Appendix A). 
 
In addition to the stated and latent 
Nigerian political and military aims in 
maintaining preeminence, their policies 
of stability tie into a policy of general 
economic expansion and development 
through ECOWAS (Adebajo 72).  
Liberia’s instability affected them not 
only directly materially, but also affected 
plans for economic expansion regionally 
and more generally.  Following elections 
set up by Nigeria in 1997, Charles Taylor 
assumed the Liberian presidency until his 
exile in 2003 ( 80), continuing policies 
that injured and killed tens of thousands 
and led to another civil war and then 
international conflict.  Ultimately, 
domestic parties resolved the dispute by 
ousting Taylor who fled to Nigeria and 
was ultimately extradited to the ICJ.  
During Taylor’s rule, the conflict 
continued and Nigeria ultimately had to 
intervene a second time through 
ECOMOG, which by then had become a 
more institutionalized part of ECOWAS, 
to try to end the second Liberian War.  
Nigeria fell under significant pressure to 
reverse courses from direct confrontation 
with Taylor to conciliation. 
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Because Liberia was considered a core 
interest, it was less likely to be responsive 
to military pressure.  It is also probable, 
given Nigeria was still attempting to 
establish its legitimacy as a regional 
hegemon with military capacity to 
intervene, that failure was perceived as 
simply not an option by Nigeria’s rulers.  
Because there was generally no direct link 
between popular will and governance, 
and the actual cost of Nigerian 
intervention is not transparent, there was 
also a greater likelihood of a long 
intervention from which Nigeria would 
not withdraw.  Popular distaste for tactics 
or length or costs would not be reflected 
in policy as they would in a democratic 
state.  Secondly, after the conclusion of 
intervention, there are already regional 
institutions in place to assist policies of 
economic development and bolster trade.  
Rather than breeding dependence on the 
hegemonic participant as would be 
expected especially in the case of 
autocratic interest-driven intervention, 
multilateral institutions to encourage 
regional trade and domestic development 
programs.  Because stability did not 
return until the elections following 
Taylor’s ouster, the majority of these 
effects remain to be seen although 
improvement does appear to have 
occurred.  
 
Conclusions for Democratic Effects on Military 
Intervention: 
Autocratic hegemony need not be 
completely menacing, but Nigeria’s 
ultimate conciliatory stance toward 
Taylor most hurt the cause of peace.  
Deployment and command may have 
been partly multi-lateral, clearly at least 
initially favoring Nigerian interests.  
However, the negotiated settlement 
favored a particular member of the dyadic 
conflict, as Taylor was perceived as the 
main player at the time.  This illustrates 
the normative difficulties associated with 
transition from rebel group (non-state 
actor) to government (state actor).  
Taylor’s rebel faction had no need to 
conform to international norms or 
obligations, and his presidential rule 
reflected this.  Nigeria, facing civil strife 
and graft, was also accused of applying 
sanctions unequally during conflict 
(along with the US).  The unilateral 
Nigerian nature of the peace not 
surprisingly led many of its weaker 
neighbors to fear Nigeria’s “penchant for 
a unilateral diplomatic style that offends 
the sensibilities of smaller, poorer and 
weaker states” (Adebajo 77). 
 
Adebajo correctly concludes that 
hegemony was necessary to spur and 
sustain the interventions in Liberia.  But 
the hegemonic leadership bid occurred 
through a regional organization 
exhibiting bounded competition.  
Indeed, the initial 1990 intervention 
through ECOMOG helped 
institutionalize ECOWAS’s role as a 
West African peacekeeping mechanism 
and institution, and Nigeria’s hegemonic 
leadership.  The most important effects 
of democratic hegemony are in the peace 
resolution following conflict.  Nigeria 
initially intervened during the civil war, 
and its reputation suffered as a result of 
unilateral and heavy-handed actions 
during conflict.  However, the ultimate 
nature of the peace-settlement was 
unilateral, with Nigeria playing a 
disproportionate role in elections, and 
resulting in “their newly found client” 
gaining power. 
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However, in peace resolution, democratic 
norms should apply more than in the 
crisis of conflict, unless the political 
resolution itself is a response to crisis.  As 
things began to go poorly for Nigeria it is 
conceivable this had an effect on 
Nigeria’s unilateral political resolution.  
However, Nigeria was present for the 
duration of the political solution, and 
returned to intervene in 2003.  In 
conjunction with the claims that 
Nigerian leadership saw failure as 
unacceptable, the peace resolution may 
have been expedient rather than well-
thought out.  This is not altogether 
unexpected, but contrasts distinctly with 
democratic peace-resolution.  The case of 
Israel displays murky traits of this 
conclusion, which is more obvious from 
Iraq.  There is a significant argument to 
be made on either side that the political 
resolution, following official combat 
operations in Iraq, was unilaterally 
imposed.  In fact, the unilateral or 
multilateral nature of peace resolution is 
not of the utmost importance.  Despite 
the messiness of the solution, power was 
distributed unevenly among a number of 
factions, ethnicities and individuals. 
 
If this conclusion holds true, it would 
provide a striking discontinuity between 
US Cold War intervention and 
intervention after the “New World 
Order.”  The unilateral nature of the 
solution may be partly the result of 
hegemony itself, as Buena de la 
Mesquita’s power exception does not 
hold true (Dixon and Senses 548).  The 
key distinction is distribution of power 
post-settlement.  Though the idea that 
the US would seek to distribute power 
beyond one individual differs from Cold 
War policy, it follows logically from the 
norms argument in conditions of 
systemic hegemony.  This must be 
clarified slightly, during conflict – in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia – 
the US has found it convenient to 
collude with local groups in conflict and 
peace-resolution.  This is not new or 
surprising, and is probably more material 
realism than idealism.  However, after 
conflict, where we would expect the 
resurgence of democratic norms in 
affecting the US public and leaders, we 
find that democratic norms heavily 
influence the peace settlement.  In Iraq 
because it may be argued that the present 
“peace settlement” is complicated by the 
de facto continuation of military 
intervention, contributing to nationalism 
and injuring US-Iraqi relations.  The US 
may accurately be accused of heavy-
handed post-peace meddling, but the 
peace displays a divided power structure, 
rather than a return to dependent 
clientele.  In Afghanistan, despite 
employing Northern Alliance members to 
assist in fighting, and granting some of 
those persons positions of power, the 
Northern Alliance has not been 
unilaterally granted centralized power in 
Iraq. 
 
Therefore, democracies tend to follow 
the conflict-proper with a less centralized 
peace settlement, as expected from 
democratic norms.  This contention also 
holds true in the Lebanon War, through 
which the United States was Israel’s 
prime benefactor.  The unilateral nature 
of the intervention in addition to the 
historical perception, of Israel’s 
neighbors, that Israel is an aggressive 
unilateral state, hurt prospects for 
international cooperation.  The same is 
true for the United States in Iraq.  
14
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Hegemonic leadership bids best occur 
through multilateral frameworks – 
employing hegemonic leadership within 
the context of an extant mechanisms or 
institutions.  It is not clear that when 
core interests are threatened democracies 
act significantly different from 
autocracies, which follows from Kegley 
and Hermann’s normative argument.  
The outcome of this war had negative 
effects for Israel’s leaders, especially 
Prime Minister Olmert, and the new 
party Kadima – which may not live until 
its name (tomorrow) as a result.  Feedback, 
especially death from intervention, 
generally hurts the sustainability of 
democratic intervention.  Under a 
multilateral umbrella this may lead to 
defection rather than withdrawal – as 
with Spain.  Feedback plays a large part 
in affecting future interventions and the 
ability for democratic states to intervene.  
Unlike state actors, Hizballah had no 
formal army and thus presented a tactical 
problem.  But it is clear that the “like 
units” argument is exacerbated by the 
present US agenda of anti-terrorism.  
Groups perceived as having terrorist 
leanings, even those democratically 
elected are not as likely to be seen as 
democratic entities as would be 
democratically elected governments of 
states.  Hamas has basically inherited a 
state but such de facto sovereignty in 
league with a terrorist label further 
detracts from the perception of “like 
units.”  In the case of Israel, this may 
have made goals less realistically.  
Regardless, Israel’s public was massively 
dissatisfied with the war, and theorists 
have begun chiding powers for unilateral 
action (Impact Of The Lebanon War On 
Hamas And Kadima).  Similarly, the US 
withdrew from Somalia after 18 deaths, 
producing a greater aversion to African 
peacekeeping (Adebajo 72).  The 
articulation of Clinton’s intervention 
guidelines – the PDD-25 (examined later) 
– also displayed leaders’ aversion to 
peacekeeping.  The media plays a large 
role in shaping and promoting ideas that 
can feed back on publics and thus leaders 
in democratic states.  The same is not the 
case if the public has no relationship to 
its government. 
 
Soft, Non-Military, or Coercive Intervention: 
Coercive intervention is third-party 
involvement in a dispute, involving soft 
power but not military power.  Just as 
there are bound to be certain differences 
that complicated the comparative analysis 
of cases, coercive intervention poses this 
problem particularly acutely.  In order to 
consider sanctions or other coercive 
involvement in conflict hegemonic, it 
must be spearheaded by a hegemonic 
leadership bid.  Since the fall of the 
USSR, “half the world’s population” has 
at one time lived under sanctions (Euclid 
459). 
 
 The cases dealt with here provide two 
models of coercive intervention.  The 
first, punitive sanctions against Iraq, deal 
with the ability of states to employ 
coercive pressure to punish states into 
compliance.  The second, Russian 
diplomatic engagement displays a greater 
tendency towards the bargaining model – 
in contrast to punitive.  In either case, 
the ultimate goal to produce regime or 
policy-change, may be aided by the 
presence of opposition groups (Euclid 
470).  Aung San Suu Kyi has called for 
sanctions against Burma, as had the ANC 
in South Africa.  Punitive engagement 
detracts from the international legitimacy 
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of the state in favor of those opposition 
groups.  However, the effect may be a 
state crackdown or conciliation.  The 
presence of such groups, however, 
indicates a level of democracy, in contrast 
to more autocratic governments.  
Autocracies, because they are best poised 
to control their economies, may actual be 
emboldened by sanctions – as Iraq (471). 
 
Euclid’s article raises the idea of 
bargaining versus punitive methods and 
models of intervention.  He draws 
distinctions between blunt sanctions, and 
smart sanctions that have generally not 
been applied by the US or UN.  The 
general nature of sanctions applied 
follows logically from the idea that states 
may use sanctions as a cost-effective 
alternative or precursor to war.  This 
would appeal to democratic leaders as a 
cost-effective option to placate publics 
and maintain their political survival.  The 
negative humanitarian effect is generally 
recognized, especially in the case of blunt 
execution.  The humanitarian response, 
to which democracies are generally more 
receptive because of civil society and the 
growing concern of humanitarianism to 
democratic publics, such as humanitarian 
aid may actually lengthen conflict by 
providing aid to militant groups as in 
Bosnia (Stedman 15).  The exacerbation 
of humanitarian crises may also 
contribute to the difficulty of political 
solution.  Moreover, because punitive 
sanctions may embolden governments 
just as they grant legitimacy to opposition 
groups, sanctions may also create new 
groups detracting from or complicating a 
solution.  Sanctions have generally been 
applied by developed countries (Euclid 
460).  Moreover, coercive intervention is 
usually goal-based and is not always 
concerned with the dimensions of peace 
resolution.  This was the case with 
sanctions against Iraq preceding the Gulf 
War.  The sanctions regime following the 
War may have suffered from a lack of 
clear goals, rather destroying Iraq’s 
capability to be a rogue aggressor state. 
 
Thus one would expect democratic 
hegemons to be more likely to apply 
sanctions or coercive diplomatic and 
economic pressure.  The effectiveness of 
sanctions in reversing or deterring 
policies and actions may be limited, but 
can produce results.  Democratic 
presence in a hegemon may not produce 
a positive result.  Sanctions are usually 
state-centered and thus produce a 
disproportionate effect on the state rather 
than sub-state (non-state) actors.  Punitive 
sanctions clearly have less specific goals, 
but the weakening of state capacity allows 
the intrusion of other states with 
expansionist or aspiring-hegemonic 
policies.  The result of sanctions and a 
movement from cooperative soft-power 
engagement to a confrontational stance 
also injures the ability of states to collect 
information.  The effect on democracies 
here may be different because 
information tends to be freer than non-
democracies.  However, it is not possible 
to claim that media has a greater effect on 
either broad-label of regime 
configuration.  Rather, the effect of faulty 
information on democracies tends to 
have a greater effect on the public that is 
directly related to resultant state policy.  
Djingoism is no less popular in non-
democracies, indeed may be more so, but 
information can be better tempered and 
controlled to fit state-policy and interests.  
This is not always the case with 
democracies and thus as sanctions to 
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produce effects, the likelihood that 
contradictory information will produce a 
policy change is more likely, but may 
depend on media framing as well.  US 
sanctions have remained relatively 
consistent against Cuba since their 
inception, but the US has led efforts to 
step up sanctions against Iran based on 
new information – every few years.  Iraq 
sanctions also underwent changes – and 
the coercive intervention of inspectors 
was also affected by US pressure affected 
by the media and access to information. 
 
The punitive and bargaining bifurcation 
may reveal something about the nature of 
democratic employment of sanctions.  
Punitive sanctions have longer-term, less-
clear goals, and tend to be less receptive 
to change – as with Cuba – though key 
interests may be at stake.  Conversely, 
Iran – while sanctions are punitive – has 
been targeted by successively evolving 
series and types of sanctions designed to 
produce particular policy changes.  Part 
of Euclid’s argument is that the Iraq 
sanctions regime did produce certain 
compliance, the same may be said about 
Iran.  Based on the initial framing of the 
dispute, democracies may be more 
resilient as compliance does occur, falling 
prey to idealism.  This is not any less true 
with non-democracies, and clearly 
Nigeria’s goals for West African 
hegemony represent broad ideologically-
based interpretable goals.  This is a 
stumbling block for all states, but the 
media and public in democracies can 
have a greater involvement in clarifying 
goals and compliance. 
 
Democratic Coercive Intervention: The Iraq 
Sanctions Regime After the Cold War 
The enmity bred between the US and its 
former client Iraq after the Gulf War 
contributed to a desire for greater action, 
no doubt aided by some demands in the 
US to topple the regime then.  Sanctions 
intensified after the conflict partly to 
disable the Iraq regime after the limited 
but successful repulsion of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait.  The initial invasion had 
limited goals, and was hegemonic military 
intervention.  According to Euclid, 
Martin and Laurenti have validated the 
view that sanctions attempt to create 
escalating pressure of increasing sanctions 
to punish states (Euclid 460).  Indeed 
sanctions may because they are one tool 
in a spectrum of policy instruments 
(472).  Because the goals of sanctions are 
broadly defined – even in context usually 
– negative effects of sanctions were not 
initially taken into account.  In Iraq, 
there was a surge in child mortality rates 
and malnourishment concurrent with a 
drastic decline in quality of life, health 
infrastructure and GDP, because of the 
embargo on the main source of income – 
oil (467).  Because of the authoritarian 
nature of the Iraq regime, and its strong 
control over its economy, these effects 
created significant bad will between Iraqis 
– and humanitarians in general – and the 
United States. 
 
The goals of sanctions were broad, 
requiring full compliance without 
concessions, though this was supported 
by the US and much of the international 
community (476).  US pressure for an 
escalating series of resolutions, beginning 
with 660, then 661 (463) validates the 
contention that sanctions are often seen 
as an escalating mechanism.  Moreover, 
despite UN and US demands for full, 
uncompromising compliance, there was 
limited Iraqi compliance (Euclid 462).  
The fact that two sanctions regimes led to 
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US spearheaded militarized intervention 
may rely more on feedback as well.  
Though sanctions had limited 
compliance, such compliance occurred 
over the course of more than a decade.  
Such results may not be encouraging 
especially if sanctions coercive 
intervention is not perceived as achieving 
results.  This may explain, until recently, 
the increasingly militant rhetoric toward 
Iran and explains the escalating rhetoric 
toward Iraq.  Therefore, political survival 
of leaders becomes contingent on results 
and may overshadow the effectiveness of 
sanctions, leading to conflict.  If 
sanctions are perceived as ineffective as a 
policy response, then democracies would 
be more likely to escalate policies as a 
result of the perception of ineffectiveness 
for their own political careers – or to 
fight for progressive sanctions. 
 
According to Euclid, Kofi Annan 
described sanctions as a the “blunt 
instrument,” (Euclid 468) that posed a 
dichotomous problem between 
preserving peace and human life.  Just as 
sanctions and inspections destroyed the 
capacity of the state to prosecute 
aggression, it also hurt the state’s ability 
to provide social services.  This not only 
hurt sub-state Iraqi perception of the US, 
UN and its intentions, but also may have 
created a gap in power, which created a 
favorable environment for sub-state actors 
that could complicate peace resolution – 
as terrorism.6  Sanctions against the Iraqi 
government also contributed to the de 
facto sovereignty of Kurdistan in Iraq, 
further weakening the central state and 
increasing the tacit recognition of other 
actors in the conflict.  A similar 
                                                
6 The expansion of terrorist networks in Ba’athist 
Iraq was not a threat. 
phenomenon occurred during the de 
facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh 
in (physically) Azerbaijan. 
 
The dual demands of humanitarian 
preservation and punitive intervention, 
led to the Oil for Food program, which 
helped mitigate the humanitarian disaster 
produced by sanctions (and wars) (Euclid 
468).  As expected, humanitarian 
assistance contributed to government 
coffers.  More specifically, it allowed the 
creation of a large black-market, and 
obscenely wealthy government officials 
from oil smuggling.  Blunt punitive 
engagements appears to have limited 
success in achieving some objectives.  It is 
unable to achieve major objectives 
(Euclid 476), and therefore probably does 
not contribute strongly to the resolution 
of peace.  Rather, Euclid contends that 
the impact and success are more likely to 
be based around bargaining dynamics. 
 
Autocratic: Nagorno-Karabakh and the new 
Russian Hegemony: 
Euclid’s conclusion is interesting in the 
context of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)7 
Conflict, because Armenia’s internal 
political debate over policy options 
reflects a similar duality.  Similar to 
punitive versus bargaining strategies, 
Armenia’s debate was over step-by-step 
versus comprehensive methodology to 
peace resolution.  The step-by-step 
process, applying rewards for partial 
compliance, more represents a bargaining 
model; whereas “package” resolution 
requires rewards for full compliance and 
presumably punitive measures for non-
compliance.  The war began in 1988, 
complicated by the nebulous political 
situation and lack of traditional 
                                                
7 Not the Democratic Republic of North Korea. 
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sovereignty.  The status of Nagorno-
Karabakh was disputed under the Soviet 
Union, the last instance of which was a 
NK Soviet request for secession from the 
Azerbaijan Soviet in 1988, which began 
the present phase of the conflict 
(Zourabian 252). 
 
Three key issues are identified as shaping 
the conditions for analysis.  First, the 
conflict began in a regional environment 
of political collapse and then transition.  
Armenia was a transitioning democracy 
at best before 1995 (See: Appendix A), 
whereas Azerbaijan exhibited far greater 
tendencies toward autocracy.  The 
political status of the disputants: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-
Karabakh were undetermined at the start 
of conflict.  Secondly, political transitions 
have created new prospects for peace at 
the level of individual leaders.  Thirdly, 
the most important aspect of this case is 
the demonstration of initial Russian 
hegemonic tendency in providing an 
initial peace-agreement.  The subsequent 
years of negotiation have shown Russian 
willingness to work within a multi-lateral 
framework for a comprehensive peace 
with all parties. 
 
The collapse of the system of soviets led 
to political vacuums in the Caucuses.  
This may have been offset in Armenia by 
the adoption of preexisting political 
structures.  Tel-Patrossian, leader of the 
Karabakh Committee under the Soviet 
system, quickly became the first 
Armenian president.  The Karabakh 
Committee’s existence also helped "lay 
the foundation for a national army 
within a few months" (Papazian 238), 
Each side relied on mercenaries 
(especially Russian mercenaries), whereas 
Azerbaijan was significantly weaker 
militarily and relied also on foreign 
mujahidin.  As is expected of a 
democracy in crisis – and especially a 
transitioning democracy – Armenia was 
initially more aggressive and more 
successful.  The Armenia policy initially, 
however was for the security of 
Armenians in NK, and not for the 
region’s independence as evidenced by a 
1992 interview of Tel-Patrossian by 
Turkish daily Cumuhuriyet (Papazian 
238).  These democracies, Russia and 
Armenia, cannot be treated in the same 
way as those who have developed 
institutions, norms, and records of norm-
compliance.  There is a question of the 
baseline indicators for democracy, but as 
a transitioning partial democracy, there is 
a contrast in the effects of democracy on 
Russian hegemony versus US hegemony 
– clearly democratic. 
 
The main political transitions have 
occurred in Russia and Armenia.  Firstly, 
the fall of the USSR paved the way for 
the election of Boris Yeltsin.  Armenia 
relied heavily on Russian economic and 
military support, though between 1988 
and 1991 support for USSR-Armenia 
alliance declined (Papazian 239).  Russian 
support has consistently been a hallmark 
of Armenian security policy, however, 
and was aided by the embargos enacted 
by Azerbaijan in 1991 and Turkey in 
1993.  Russian and Armenian collusion 
was an attempt to provide Russian 
regional security through Armenia.  This 
relationship is not surprising given the 
similar democracy ratings of the two 
countries and the historical religious 
relationship, but was aided by the amity 
between Tel-Patrossian and Yeltsin ().  In 
1991, Russia and Armenia concluded the 
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Treaty of Friendship, in May 1992 the 
Collective Security Treaty, and in 1997 
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance.  The presence of 
mujahidin, and the cultural differences in 
religion and increasingly governance, no 
doubt hurt relations between Russia and 
Azerbaijan by altering the perception of 
its similarity politically. 
 
Russia managed to broker a cease-fire 
agreement in 1994 and then the OSCE 
gained a mandate for negotiations.  From 
that point, Tel-Petrossian favored a step-
by-step process similar to the bargaining 
model.  Between 1994 and 1998, little 
progress was made on the hundreds of 
thousands of refugees on both sides or 
the political status of NK.  Domestic 
constitutional referenda and coup 
attempts affected democracy rankings 
and probably elite-orientation as well 
(Papazian 245).  Tel-Patrossian’s ouster 
(resignation) in favor of Kocharian, who 
is from NK, was supposedly due to the 
unpopularity of the step-by-step method.  
Kocharian had long advocated package 
deal (Zourabian 253).  Kocharian’s 1998 
position began and ended with demands 
for independence rather than minority 
protection: 
 
“(1) No vertical links between Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, which means that Nagorno-
Karabakh cannot be subordinated to Azerbaijan; 
(2) security guarantees for the population of 
Nagorno-Karabakh; 
(3) preservation of the control over the land link 
with Armenia." (Zourabian 260) 
 
While the shift may have been rhetorical 
in reality more than it was a shift in 
policy (Papazian 242), this reflects 
conditions on the ground and NK de 
facto sovereignty.  Kocharian espoused 
that the conflict was territorial between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan a large shift 
from the initial OSCE framework of 
three parties (Zourabian 253).  Moreover, 
the Paris and Key West land-swap talks of 
2002 helped de-legitimize the package 
option by illustrating potential successes 
of the step-by-step process (Zourabian 
254).  Clearly Armenian politics is very 
sensitive to the lack of results in the 
short-term.8  Because of Armenia’s 
democracy ranking, some amount of 
feedback is expected, and has in cases led 
to militarized re-escalation. 
 
The key factor in the success of the 
movement toward peace has been 
twofold: Russian hegemonic leadership; 
and a multilateral, inclusive bargaining 
framework.  The initial cease-fire, while 
unilateral, was instrumental in cementing 
multilateral negotiations through the 
OSCE, thus assisting the formalization of 
mechanisms for negotiation (Zourabian 
253).  After the appointment of a French 
representative to the OSCE negotiating 
team in addition to the Russian member, 
Azerbaijan fought strongly for a US 
representative to dilute bias (258).  This 
may also have been to challenge Russian 
hegemony but the US did not spearhead 
or lead any efforts.  Tel-Petrossian’s 1996 
veto of an OSCE resolution during the 
1996 Libson Summit because it would 
violate Armenia’s mandate to negotiate 
illustrates the general consistency of 
Armenia’s position on NK’s murky legal 
status (257).  However, despite these 
setbacks, the OSCE framework has 
helped greatly to force all parties toward a 
more realistic compromise solution 
rather than an eternal struggle of 
unconstrained state interests.  There are 
worries that violence could re-ignite 
                                                
8 Changes have occurred once every four years. 
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(Transitions Online), however as of 
November 29, 2007 the US, French, and 
Russian delegations presented Basic 
Principles to all sides in an attempt to 
create a final agreement before Armenian 
elections in 2008.  The details of 
agreement, especially on final status 
issues, may not be completely perfected, 
however there is a basic recognition of 
what will occur.  There will be land 
swapping and NK will remain 
independent and likely have free access to 
the Lachin Corridor (on Azerbaijani 
territory) that connects NK to Armenia.  
The conflict is not ended, but there is a 
large amount of partial compliance that 
may become fully internationally 
legitimized compliance in a very short 
period of time. 
 
 
Conclusions for the effects of Democracy: 
The most sensitive issue in the 
measurement of these cases is whether 
Russia was a democratic state at the time 
of its diplomatic intervention in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.  Polity IV 
data suggest that Russia was not 
democratic, but might have been a 
transitioning democracy.  Transitioning 
democracies behave differently than 
established democracies, additionally the 
crisis of political collapse no doubt 
weighed heavily on leaders (Kegley and 
Hermann 516).  Russia’s status may have 
included greater attempts at rhetorical 
democracy to placate the West rather 
than actual transition.  Russia may 
therefore have had a greater propensity to 
support Armenia as a result of its partially 
democratic government in addition to 
cultural similarity – as suggested by 
Dixon and Senese.   
 
The Russian intervention in Nagorno-
Karabakh has clearly been more 
successful in advancing the cause of peace 
resolution for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
approach to coercive investment, 
however framed,9 affects the objectives of 
intervention.  Objectives are not really 
important to this debate except in their 
relationship to ultimate peace resolution.  
If objectives are created irrespective of the 
ultimate cause of peace and peace 
resolution, the approach will not be as 
likely to affect peace resolution.  
Generally, however, methodology does 
affect the resolution of peace: 
engagement versus isolation, and partial 
versus full compliance.  The cases suggest 
that peace resolution may be best served 
by engagement in accordance with partial 
compliance (toward full compliance).  
Secondly, unilateralism in hegemonic 
intervention has a limited place.  
Hegemony is a bid to lead intervention, and 
so hegemonic intervention by definition 
necessitates some degree of unilateral 
hegemonic leadership initially.  Adebajo 
concludes hegemonic leadership was 
necessary to sustain interventions in 
Somalia (the US) and Liberia (Nigeria).  
In Bosnia, Clinton was convinced 
American hegemonic leadership was 
necessary in light of European inaction 
(Morales 94).  This case resulted in 
military intervention, but the point is still 
apparent.  Hegemonic leadership is also 
sometimes necessary to spearhead 
impetus for intervention.  The US has 
been instrumental in employing 
sanctions against certain countries like 
Iran, Iraq, and Cuba. 
 
                                                
9 (Bargaining, step-by-step, punitive, package in 
the case terminology) 
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Unilateral hegemonic leadership, 
however, cannot persist beyond a certain 
point.  At a certain point this must move 
to a multilateral framework, involving the 
compromise of interests in order to 
achieve bigger goals.  Unilateral sanctions 
are not effective without collusion from 
other states, which is why sanctions, 
when applied, generally do involve 
coalitions or multilateral organizations 
like the UN.  In terms of intervention in 
active conflict, the standard should be the 
conclusion of military conflict.10  Even 
multilateral sanctions are unlikely to 
reverse aggression anyway as was the case 
with the regime after the invasion of 
Kuwait and prior to the Gulf War.  
Multilateral sanctions are still more likely 
to be successful at influencing capabilities 
and dyadic relationships during conflict.  
The Azerbaijani and Turkish embargoes 
were instrumental in solidifying 
Armenian political support for an 
alliance with Russia, which had been 
under reconsideration.  Russia, in the 
NK case, appears to have more 
successfully executed a withdrawal from 
its unilateral position than has the US or 
Israel in negotiations.  This is probably 
explained by feedback and the need and 
appearance to appear hard in the face of 
non-compliance.  Without efficient 
results their careers are in jeopardy, and 
this may make it difficult for democratic 
hegemons not to escalate intervention in 
the face of non-compliance with coercive 
intervention.  This does not always mean 
this will result in military conflict as with 
Somalia, Iraq, and Lebanon, but it does 
mean that the likelihood of an escalation 
                                                
10 Unilateral intervention may be employed to 
produce a peaceful settlement but should not be 
employed during the dispute settlement – after 
the cessation of hostilities. 
of democratic hegemons’ policies and 
rhetoric is greater than with non-
democratic hegemons. 
 
It is clear that while sanctions may be 
employed as escalating pressure, 
sanctions may also be employed by 
democracies to placate public demands 
for action where greater action is unlikely 
to be employed.  As stated earlier, 
feedback may actually make intervention 
more likely by increasing public 
knowledge on the issue and creating 
general frustration over lack of results or 
action.  The other key issue is how norms 
affect the perceptions of leaders, elites, 
and publics perceptions of like units.  
Democracies are also more likely to 
engage in a more flexible bargaining 
process and more amicable relationship 
with states perceived as “like.”  Outside 
of conflict and intervention decision-
making, this does not necessarily mean 
that democracies are more likely to have 
good relationship with other 
democracies.11  It does mean that 
democracies are more likely to have 
amicable relationships with democracies 
greater than with non-democracies on the 
whole.  However there is a trump card in 
the US War on Terrorism, the massive 
shift in priorities from PDD-25 to the 
Bush Doctrine – in which heavy 
restrictions on intervention morphed 
into pre-emptive and preventive 
ideological wars – represents a shift in US 
perceptions of “rogue” or “terrorist” 
states as the super-other.12  This explains 
                                                
11 Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt all receive 
significant amounts US military aid. 
12 This is evidenced by Hamas’s election and de 
facto sovereignty.  Despite the relative moderation 
of Hamas after elections – and their democratic 
election and de facto sovereignty in Gaza – 
relations with the US and Israel are significantly 
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why the US was more likely to be 
inflexible and heavy-handed with Iraq 
than Russia with Armenia.  Russia and 
Armenia both saw themselves as 
transitioning Christian democracies with 
a relationship less strained than others.  
Azerbaijan was not assisted by the 
presence of foreign mujahidin.  
Hegemons have a large breadth in setting 
the agenda of international labels – or 
dichotomies of perception.13  This 
influences relevant leaders perceptions of 
like units and thus perception of how 
bounded their decisions are by norms – 
supported by Kegley and Hermann 
(1995).  
 
Non-Intervention: 
There are myriad reasons why 
intervention may not occur – non-
intervention, so a brief description will 
suffice, which will be greatly clarified in 
the case of Rwanda.  Regional hegemony 
increases the likelihood of hegemonic 
intervention by adding interests that may 
coincide with intervention.  Intervention 
by a regional hegemon is especially likely 
if American interests coincide with 
intervention as well.  Thus an absence of 
regional hegemony, or a lack of American 
interest in intervention makes non-
intervention more likely.  Additionally, 
lack of multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral 
initiative or consensus internationally 
also detracts from the likelihood of 
intervention.  Opposition may grow to 
hegemonic action by other aspiring 
hegemons or by coalitions as with China 
in Darfur and Russia and China in Iran.  
However, hegemonic inaction or apathy 
                                                                 
more strained by the perception of the group and 
area as “terrorist” – the super-other. 
13 Communism vs. Democracy, Terrorism vs. 
Freedom 
may also affect the calculation of other 
states’ interests toward intervention.  In 
democracies a lack of popular support, 
media and political framing of the issue 
and feedback also play a role in deterring 
future intervention. 
 
Inaction: How Somali Fighters Killed American 
Troops and Prevented a Rwanda Intervention 
There are three main reasons for 
American inaction in Rwanda during the 
genocide in the summer of 1994.  The 
case itself need not be explained here in 
full.  The Arusha Accords had ended 
fighting between partisan Tutsi militias 
and the Hutu government of Rwanda.  
The UN had dispatched a small force of 
2500 commanded by Dallaire as 
UNAMIR (Power Bystanders to 
Genocide:VI) to help implement the 
Arusha Accords.  On August 7, 1994 the 
plane of the Rwandan President was shot 
down landing in Kigali, beginning nearly 
4 months of massacres of Tutsis by 
Hutus.  With the exception of 
intervention early in April by European 
powers and US troops to withdraw their 
citizens, there was virtually no initiative 
on intervention.  The US and France 
both drew up plans for interventions that 
began to be executed, with problems and 
delays, no earlier than July.  By this time 
the RPF militias, who had been stationed 
in Kigali under the Arush Accords, had 
toppled the Hutu government and mostly 
ended the genocide. 
 
Intervention did not occur because there 
was a lack of will at the international 
level, and domestic American conditions 
significantly impacted by the presence of 
democracy.  The lack of action or 
consensus internationally, unlike in the 
case of Liberia in which there were 
merely problems of consensus and the 
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threat of hegemonic dominance.  Because 
hegemonic unilateralism would have 
been beneficial, if hegemonic 
intervention is a necessary condition to 
world peace, then the US may have in 
some sense skirted its duties.  This may 
be implicit in a statement by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense on May 1 that a 
genocide finding could commit the US to 
actually “do something” (Power 
Bystanders…:VII).  European states 
similarly were wary of peacekeeping 
efforts beyond the initial evacuation of 
their citizens.  Not surprisingly, the 
democratic states of Western Europe and 
the United States saw Rwanda’s strategic 
interest only in terms of the evacuation of 
their own personnel.  The justification 
that US leaders may not have been aware 
of the potential scope of conflict and thus 
potentially humanitarian interests 
appears not to hold water.  In an April 11 
memo prepared for the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy stated that "Unless 
both sides can be convinced to return to 
the peace process, a massive (hundreds of 
thousands of deaths) bloodbath will 
ensue" (Power Bystanders…:VII).  The 
consistent appeals of UNAMIR 
Commander Roméo Dallaire were 
repeatedly met with opposition by the US 
(until July) on the grounds that it could 
escalate into a costly American venture 
(Power Bystanders…:IX). 
 
In part this was caused by a significant 
difference in various parties’ perceptions 
of the interests at stake, the players, 
motives, and nature of the conflict itself.  
There were some meager attempts at non-
hegemonic coercive intervention, and 
indeed UNAMIR was present.  European 
states had initially wanted to pull their 
peace-keepers in response to non-
compliance with the Arusha Accords 
(prior to the genocide) (Power 
Bystanders…:V).  Such action played 
directly into the hands of Hutu 
commanders who most sought to benefit 
from a European and American 
withdrawal.  Because of the presence of 
democracy, European states but more 
importantly the US may not have been 
able to see past the interests of its 
citizens.  Additionally, the US’s 
involvement in Rwanda was shallow, and 
US officials were no doubt inclined to 
trust Rwandan officials, representing a 
sovereign state with a commitment to the 
peace agreement (Power Bystanders…:V).  
Additionally, because of the lack of US 
experience with the region, policymakers 
expected a certain level of ethnic 
violence.  They may potentially have 
underestimated the scale and form of 
violence, but the US also did not react to 
ethnically-motivated killings in Brundi 
(Power Bystanders…:V). 
 
Indeed it is clear that the perception of 
interests did not extend beyond the 
evacuation of civilians, following which 
Clinton suggested it was a “Job well 
done” (Power Bystanders…:VI), at which 
point Rwanda was not even a priority 
rhetorically (Bystanders…:VIII).  Because 
the US was also inclined to see the 
conflict as one of a breakdown of peace 
talks or governmental infighting, which is 
to be expected from the normative 
argument, there was also a perception of 
the need for internal political settlement 
and solution.  This same claim was 
forwarded by Stedman for Bosnian 
parties in military conflict, but this is a 
case not of international (and) intra-state, 
but rather intra-state and inter-group.  
Thus the problem was articulated in 
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terms of ‘national interest’ and 
‘humanitarian consequences’ but not on 
the level of human tragedy (Bystandes…: 
VIII). 
 
Effects of Democracy on Hegemonic Non-
Intervention: 
The effects of democracy on US inaction 
are striking.  Norms have a more 
pronounced effect on the government, 
societal, and individual levels of 
democracies than non-democracies.  The 
US clearly placed too much faith in a 
peace-resolution viewpoint of the issue.  
The US was apt to take assurances from 
the Rwandan government that it was 
committed to the Arusha Accords, and 
that that was connected to the conflict.  
The US accepted UNAMIR only after 
significant French lobbying pressure 
(Power Bystanders…:IV).  Even having 
accepted Dallaire's intervention plan, and 
having agreed to send equipment the US 
still pushed a return to the Arusha 
Accords (Power Bystanders…:XI).  
Additionally, because of the awareness of 
hegemony, most officials defined 
intervention as ethical (Power 
Bystanders…:XII).  Leaders tended to 
exaggerate the precedent set by an 
intervention in Rwanda, possibly also 
seeing intervention as counterproductive.  
Members of the Clinton Administration 
detracted from the issue of genocide in 
part because of unfamiliarity in dealing 
with non-state institutions and groups, 
and a general ignorance of sub-state 
issues.  The American public also treated 
the problem "as a civil war requiring a 
cease-fire or as a 'peacekeeping problem' 
requiring a UN withdrawal... [not a] 
genocide demanding instant action" 
(Power Bystanders…:X).  Generally officials 
and the public suffered from a general 
lack of knowledge of Rwanda, which 
meant a general lack of domestic lobby 
pressure on the issue. 
 
In part they are attributable to the 
articulation of PDD-25, the Clinton 
Administration Policy on Reforming 
Multilateral Peace Operations, which 
restricted US involvement in 
intervention in general.  This was largely 
a feedback response from the 
unpopularity of the death of American 
soldiers in Somalia, and thus a general 
aversion to African peacekeeping (Power 
Bystanders…:IV).  Bodies of Belgian 
soldiers returned to Brussels on April 14 
drew a parallel to Somalia and on April 
15 Warren Christopher wrote to Albright 
instructing her to demand a full 
UNAMIR withdrawal, backing Belgian 
demands (Power Bystanders…:IX).  PDD-
25 weighed heavily into the minds of 
American policy makers.  However, after 
the lack of intervention, guilt has fed 
back on the public and American 
leadership, spurring interest in issues like 
Darfur (Power Bystanders…:XIII).  In 
democracies, feedback generally occurs 
on the public and is framed by leaders, 
the media, and to a certain extent 
intellectual and academic work.  
Democratic configurations also allow 
popular desires to more directly influence 
leaders’ interests, creating greater 
pressure through freer access to 
information and allowing the creation of 
organizations.  In autocracies, the 
feedback effect is directly on elites and 
leaders if at all, whereas popular feedback 
is secondary except in the form of 
widespread mobilized dissent.  Autocratic 
failures in intervention, like the 
incomplete nature of ECOMOG’s first 
information, may spur future 
intervention.  US failure in Somalia 
25
Sheflin: Effects of the Presence of Democracy in Hegemons on Hegemonic Int
Published by Digital Commons @ Colgate, 2012
 28 
weighed heavily on Clinton, who saw a 
strong public aversion to the death of 
American soldiers and had no desire to 
jeopardize his presidency with a repeat 
intervention.  The conditions provided 
by PDD-25 are very narrow by the 
standards of the precedent of the Cold 
War and the New World Order proposed 
by Bush.  A very realist document, 
although Clinton’s policy was not 
intended to be completely realist, PDD-
25 narrowly defined American interests 
in supporting or supplying troops for 
intervention – whether or not American 
involvement was requested or solicited.14  
The US voted for UNAMIR in the 
Security Council only after clear 
assurances that the US would not submit 
troops (Power Bystanders…:IV).  Especially 
since foreign policy doctrine was growing 
increasingly anti-interventionist, Rwanda 
became even less of a priority.  The US 
had few specialists and little knowledge of 
Rwanda throughout the genocide even 
on the highest levels of policy. 
 
V.  Conclusions for the Effects of 
Democracy on Intervention in 
Unipolarity: 
Traditional realism looks upon 
hegemonic states as those most powerful 
within an anarchic international system.  
The proper use of this power could grant 
unprecedented scope and control to 
hegemons in intervening.  Liberals and 
neo-liberals look upon existing 
institutions such as the UN and regional 
security arrangements as forums for 
coordination of policy and the proper 
place through which states bid for 
hegemonic leadership.  Constructivism 
stresses the effect of norms and beliefs on 
state and international action.  The 
                                                
14 PDD-25 from FAS.org. 
benefit of the Democratic Peace 
Literature is that it focuses the theories of 
international relations and tools of social 
science on the problem of democratic 
governance and its effects. 
 
Democratic Peace Literature has not 
previously examined democracies in 
positions of hegemony bidding for 
intervention leadership (increasingly 
important given the growing number of 
interventions versus traditional wars).  
Hegemony may provide such a state with 
an unprecedented opportunity to 
promote norms.  Under a bipolar system, 
states had greater latitude in choosing 
their benefactors.15 Hegemony offers a 
dichotomous view of compliance or non-
compliance with the most powerful state.  
The same is generally true with aspiring 
and regional hegemons,16 for which 
systemic hegemony provides a potential 
threat and incentive compelling aspiring 
and regional hegemons to comply with at 
least some systemically-promoted norms. 
 
The Gulf War illustrates that states 
without hegemonic blessing, those in 
contravention of hegemonic norms, risk 
conflict with the hegemon itself.  Conflict 
need not embody the traditional power 
disparity rules, but can injure a state’s 
depth of institutional participation (like 
the WTO, UN committees, regional 
security).  This has also led to an 
increasing categorization of states either 
as rogue or status quo.  The War on 
Terror has had a significant effect on 
shaping American perception of its 
interest and of the “other.”  In this case, 
                                                
15 At least three possible actions were possible: 
alignment with one of the two poles, or non-
alignment. 
16 A case could be made for China or Venezuela. 
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the US is not likely to have an amicable 
relationship in crisis with states that are 
democratic, or organizations that are 
democratic, if that organization is 
perceived to be a terrorist organization.  
The vast amounts of money in the form 
of aid and anti-terrorism support compel 
states to pay lip-service to norms to 
achieve those benefits.  Non-compliance 
reduces the likelihood of achieving those 
benefits. 
 
Regardless of the regime configuration of 
the hegemon, hegemony may be more 
likely to support autonomy of disputed 
regions in the case of territorial disputes.  
They may tend to support the status quo 
prior to conflict.  Kuwait’s independence 
was restored, and sanctions in Iraq (in 
addition to the two recent wars) were also 
were instrumental in aiding the cause of 
de facto Kurdish sovereignty.  The same 
was true in the Negarno-Karabakh 
Conflict, which has maintained a de facto 
status quo since the cessation of outright 
conflict in the early 90s.  Partly this is 
influenced by the success or by the 
compliance of conflicting parties.  
Sanctions destroyed Iraq’s material 
capability to attack Kurdistan and 
Kuwait, enforcing the status quo by 
punitive measures, supported by 
American military power.  The Caucus 
status quo was maintained by Russian 
political hegemony – or an attempt to 
reassert traditional Soviet and Russian 
dominance of the region (proving 
Russian supra-regional (but not global) 
hegemony over the Caucuses).  OSCE 
multilateral frameworks have reinforced 
the political conditions of the initial 
cease-fire agreement.  In the 2006 
Lebanon War, Israel failed at destroying 
Hizballah’s capacity to the extent it had 
initially hoped, and so the status quo was 
maintained by a failure to successfully 
assert military hegemony.  Successful 
interventions by democratic hegemons  
appear to more equitably distribute 
power in international and domestic 
arrangements.17 
 
One of the key differences is in political 
solutions following intervention.  The US 
has been significantly more willing to 
attempt actual democratic distribution of 
power or, at the very least, a distribution 
amongst elements than it was under the 
bipolar Cold War structure.  Nigeria 
proved far more willing to accommodate 
Charles Taylor politically between 1997 
and 2003, after which it was forced to 
once again intervene and eventually 
extradite him.  The transitional 
governments of Iraq and Afghanistan 
were not handed over to US allies 
outright immediately after the 
invasions.18  This issue deserves a greater 
body of quantitative research, though the 
available amount of cases may not be 
sufficient. 
 
It is unclear if democracies may also be 
predisposed to overstay their welcomes in 
the actual peace settlement.  Lengthy 
                                                
17 Because the Lebanon War was not definitively 
a success for Israel it is not included in this 
statement.  This is not to declare a winner to 
conflict but rather to proclaim that the result of 
the war put Israeli military hegemony into 
question in a way that had not existed in the 29 
years prior. (Impact Of The Lebanon War On 
Hamas And Kadima). 
18 There was no doubt a large degree of graft that 
occurred in the process of creating transitional 
governments.  Nevertheless, ensuring republican 
constitutional checks and democratic principles 
of self-governance caused the US to place 
significant constraints on its own ability to act not 
characteristic of military powers. 
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occupation has proved troubling in Iraq 
post-invasion, and the costly nature of 
prolonged occupation helped create the 
gap in sovereignty that allowed for the 
free-reign of Hizballah in South Lebanon 
(following its military incursions into 
Lebanon to expel the Palestine Liberation 
Organization).  Democracies have the 
institutional capacity to alter and adapt 
successful models for unilateral 
leadership leading to multilateral peace 
keeping after conflict, through the 
selection of leaders.  Successfully 
employed interventions can actually aid 
democratization as well.  The key is that 
democratic hegemons must actually 
undertake this practice as morally 
incumbent but also tactically and 
strategically prudent in maintaining 
proper domestic, regional, and global 
security.  Hegemons must take care not 
to exacerbate problems of occupation and 
resistance and likewise to provide an 
equitable and lasting political settlement.  
Democracies are more likely to win wars 
in which they engage, they also have the 
benefit of self-regulating political systems.  
If leaders and strategies are properly 
affected by lessons of past intervention, 
democracies have an unrivalled ability to 
aid the cause of short equitable political 
solutions. 
 
However, the US particularly has 
demonstrated its unwillingness to provide 
unilateral hegemonic leadership in 
certain key cases.  Unilateral leadership 
will cause friction, but so long as 
multilateral post-peace settlement 
mechanisms are employed, frictions will 
not necessarily deter benefits either to the 
hegemon or to the previously conflicting 
parties.  For the same reasons that 
democracies would be more or less likely 
to intervene – norms and feedback – they 
are also more likely to veer off track.  
Democracy probably does not affect the 
choice of unilateral strategies differently 
than non-democracies in that neither is 
organically more or less predisposed 
toward unilateralism.  Democratic 
hegemons are more likely to be affected 
by public beliefs (and the beliefs of 
leaders), whereas non-democratic states 
tend to be affected less directly by 
feedback from their publics.19 
 
Thus feedback from previous 
intervention experience and beliefs 
occurs differently if states have instituted 
aspects of democratic governance.  The 
ability to select leaders allows a far more 
direct connection between public norms, 
attitudes, and beliefs and those of their 
leaders.  Democracies, because of more 
direct feedback, can also more effectively 
prosecute interventions because the goals 
of intervention are likely to be more 
transparent.  They are also more likely to 
prematurely terminate interventions 
resulting in high costs to the state, its 
people, or its institutions. 
 
Nigeria’s bid for West African hegemony 
reflected underlying preferences for 
regional hegemony rather than 
specifically defined and pursued goals, 
leading to problems with prosecution of 
the ECOMOG intervention.  A greater 
body of research must be developed to 
isolate and quantify the effects of 
Democratic Peace theories on hegemonic 
intervention, though available cases may 
                                                
19 In extreme cases, exorbitant costs or deaths may 
deter a government from risking public unrest.  
The institutional channels for public expression 
of dissent, that are present in democratic states, 
are not present in non-democracies. 
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be limited.  This paper has analyzed the 
major components affecting the small 
body of cases (reflecting different types of 
intervention) after the Cold War.  
Whatever the conclusions of future 
studies, the interests of global peace and 
conflict resolution are best served by 
unilateral hegemonic military leadership 
in conjunction with a flexible multilateral 
political resolution.
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Appendix B: Benchmarks for Dispute/Resolution: 
Dispute: Democratic Military Intervention: 
 
Territorial and political sovereignty battle between Lebanese government and Hizballah in 
which Hizballah has challenged the government’s political and military monopoly and have 
challenged the political framework. 
 
Non-Democratic Military Intervention: 
 
Charles Taylor’s militias had created a civil and then trans-national war in which Liberia 
was embroiled in conflict, and the Liberian government struggled to compete with Taylor. 
 
Democratic Non-Military Intervention: 
 
Iraq’s claims that Kuwait was a part of its sovereign territory, and then invaded Kuwait. 
 
Non-Democratic Non-Military Intevention: 
 
Azerbaijan and Armenia had both claimed the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
Resolution: Democratic Military Intervention: 
 
Israel – Evacuation from Lebanon but expressed desire to destroy Hizballah. 
 
Lebanon – Reassertion of sovereignty in former Hizballah territory but significant political 
fighting between the government and Hizballah 
 
Hizballah – Continued expressed desire to destroy Israel and the occupation, continued 
lack of full compliance with the political and peace processes. 
• Low-Degree of Partial Compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
“(A) Messed Up Arab Situation!” 
 
“Lebanon with no head!” 
 
“Palestine with two heads!” 
 
“Iraq with three heads!” 
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Non-Democratic Military Intervention: 
 
Charles Taylor – Six years after his election, he was eventually ousted and later extradited 
by Nigeria to the International Criminal Court. 
 
Liberia – Having ousted Taylor, Liberia elected a new president and appears to be on an 
improving course of democratic and economic development. 
 
Nigeria – Nigeria’s insistence on stability has contributed to its apathy over the Liberian 
situation except as it affects the interests of its leaders and elites. 
 
• High-Degree of Compliance, Likely Resolved. 
 
Democratic Non-Military Intervention: 
 
Iraq – Ultimately dropped territorial claims over Kuwait. 
 
Kuwait – Disputed status not relevant. 
 
US – Explicit peace guarantees to Kuwait. 
 
• High Degree of Compliance, Resolved.1 
 
Non-Democratic Non-Military Intevention: 
 
Armenia – Gradually accepted the OSCE principles of three-parties and the outlines for 
final status issues. 
 
Azerbaijan – Has gradually accepted OSCE proposals for territory and refugee exchanges. 
 
Russia – Has operated within a flexible framework in a support capacity with France and 
the US through the OSCE following its brokerage of a unilateral cease-fire in 1994. 
• High Degree of compliance, likely to be resolved soon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 This situation was resolved prior to the Gulf War.  However, the sanctions regime helped continue to 
prevent Iraq from developing the capacity to resume the dispute.  Following the 2003 invasion it appears 
increasingly unlikely that this dispute will resurface while the Iraq-US relationship remains cordial. 
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